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Abstract
Indicators of ﬁnancial crisis generally do not have a good track record.
This paper presents an early warning system (EWS) for six countries
in Asia in which indicators do work. Our binary choice model, which
has been estimated for the period 1970:01–2001.12, has the following
features. We compare four diﬀerent currency crisis deﬁnitions, extract
a full list of currency crisis indicators from the literature, apply fac-
tor analysis to combine the indicators, and introduce dynamics. We
ﬁnd that money growth (M1 and M2), national savings, and import
growth correlate with currency crises.
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11 Introduction
Four waves of ﬁnancial crises have hit international capital markets during
the 1990s: the European Monetary System (ERM) crisis in 1992-1993, the
collapse of the Mexican peso with ’tequila eﬀects’ in 1994-1995, the Asian ﬂu
of 1997-1998, and the Russia virus in 1998. These ﬁnancial crises stimulated
the theoretical and empirical literature on the economics of the crises in
several ways, among other things on the determinants of a crisis (Kaminsky
and Reinhart, 1999), its impact on domestic output (Aghion, Bacchetta and
Banerjee, 2001), and policy implications (Rogoﬀ, 1999).
In view of the large costs associated with a ﬁnancial crisis, the question of
how to predict a crisis has become central. This resulted in the construction
of a monitoring tool, the so-called early warning system (EWS).1 An EWS
consists of a precise deﬁnition of a crisis and a mechanism for generating
predictions of crises. Typically, an EWS has an empirical structure with
indicators that contribute to a country’s vulnerability to a future crisis and
forecasts the likelihood of a ﬁnancial crisis. EWS models diﬀer widely in
terms of the deﬁnition of ﬁnancial crisis, the time span on which the EWS
is estimated and attempts to forecast, the selection of indicators, and the
statistical or econometric method.
The literature distinguishes three varieties of ﬁnancial crises: currency
crises, banking crises, and debt crises. We restrict our attention in this pa-
per to currency crises. Several methods have been suggested for EWS models.
The most popular one is used in this paper, namely qualitative response (logit
1For example, the IMF is putting a lot of eﬀort in EWS models, see IMF (2002).
2or probit) models. Examples are Frankel and Rose (1996), who study cur-
rency crises and Dermirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Detragiache (1997, 2000) on banking
crises. Alternatives are cross-country regression models with dummy vari-
ables as put forward by Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996), graphical event
studies as suggested by Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995) and the signal
extraction approach, a probabilistic model proposed by Kaminsky, Lizondo
and Reinhart (1998). In the last method values of individual indicators are
compared between crisis periods and tranquil periods. If the value of an indi-
cator exceeds a threshold, it signals an impending crisis. A common feature
of all existing EWS studies is the use of fundamental determinants of the
domestic and external sectors as explanatory variables.
This paper develops an econometric EWS for six Asian countries, Malaysia,
Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand. These coun-
tries have been selected because the Asian ﬂu hit Thailand and spread to
other countries in the region—except Singapore—almost instantaneously.
We set up logit models for currency crises with indicators extracted from
a broad set of potentially relevant ﬁnancial crisis indicators.
The set-up of our EWS is similar to Kamin, Schindler and Samuel (2001)
and Bussiere and Fratzscher (2001), who also adopt a binomial multivariate
qualitative response approach. However, while the ﬁnal result of their (un-
reported) speciﬁcation search is combinations of indicators as explanatory
variables, we apply factor analysis to reduce the information set. An addi-
tional novelty of our model is that we do not only include the level of the
factors, but also the change therein. It can be argued that the development
of the factors over time has important consequences for the probability of
3a currency crisis to occur. The models are estimated using panel data for
the January 1970–December 2001 period. The factor analysis outcomes in
combination with the estimation results allow the general conclusion that
(some) indicators of ﬁnancial crises do work, at least in our EWS of Asia.
This ﬁnding is in contrast with IMF (2002)2 and Edison (2003), who con-
clude that the performance of EWS is generally poor and at best mixed. Our
method—the combination of factor analysis and logit modeling—enables us
to answer the question posed by Bustelo (2000) whether additional indicators
have explanatory power for ﬁnancial crises. It also allows the dismissal of
uninformative indicators.
Another feature of our paper is that we distinguish four currency crisis
dating deﬁnitions. A priori we do not prefer one of the deﬁnitions. How-
ever, a within-sample signal extraction experiment reveals that the method
of Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhard is superior to the other dating schemes.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes various
methods to measure and date currency crises. The results—dummy variables
indicating dates of various crises—are summarized in frequency tables which
reveal information on the distribution of each type of crises over countries and
over time. The dummies are used in binary choice models that explain the
probability of crises. Section 3 describes our set of indicators, and presents
and discusses our main results. Section 4 presents the binomial multivariate
logit models for currency crises. Furthermore, we analyze the performance
of the models in an in-sample experiment in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2For an assessment of the EWS models at the IMF, see Berg, Borensztein and Pattillo
(2003).
42 Dating Crises
The list of studies on EWS of ﬁnancial crises is long and expanding rapidly.
A full list is beyond the scope of this paper. Interested readers are referred to
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) for papers on currency crises prior
to the East Asian crisis, and Bustelo (2000) and Bukart and Coudert (2002)
on the East Asian crisis; Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1996) and Dermirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt
and Detragiache (1997) on banking crises; and Marchesi (2003)’s survey on
debt crisis.
In this paper, we identify episodes of currency crisis in East Asia using
the original deﬁnitions proposed by Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (ERW
for short), Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (KLR), Frankel and Rose (FR)
and Zhang (Z). In addition we implement our own versions of KLR and Z
(LJK). All these methods employ an exchange rate market pressure index
which needs to exceed a threshold to signal a crisis.3
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995) made an important early eﬀort to
develop a method to measure currency pressure and to date currency crises.
Their deﬁnition of exchange rate pressure is inspired by the monetary model
of Girton and Roper (1977). The exchange rate is under pressure if the value
of a constructed index exceeds a certain threshold. The index consists of
weighted relative changes of the nominal exchange rate, international reserves
and interest rates to capture successful as well as unsuccessful speculative
3An alternative is the extreme value approach of Pozo and Amuedo-Dorantes (2003),
which does not need thresholds. Another literature focuses on contagion and dates cur-
rency crises on the base of event studies. Examples are Granger, Huang, and Yang (2000)
and Dungey and Martin (2002) who date currency crises on the basis of exchange rate
jumps and news, respectively. Finally, Abiad (2003)’s Markov-switching EWS model does
not require a priori crisis dates at all.
5attacks. All variables in their index are relative to a reference country and
their threshold is time-independent. For the dating of currency crises we
set the exchange market pressure index threshold to two standard deviations
from the mean.4 To avoid potential crises that occur together, we follow
Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995) by imposing an exclusion window of
one year, six months in the future and in the past.
The method of Eichengreen et al. was heavily criticized which led to al-
ternatives based on the same methodology. Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart
(1998) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) followed the concept of Eichen-
green et al. fairly closely, but they excluded interest rate diﬀerentials in their
index and comparisons to a reference country. Lestano et al.(2003) have their
own version of Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart in which they do not exclude
interest rates from the index.
Other alternatives are Frankel and Rose (1996) and Zhang (2001). Frankel
and Rose (1996) excludes unsuccessful attacks from the index, since these are
hard to detect. They—and also Esquivel and Larrain (1998)—drop interna-
tional reserves and interest rate diﬀerentials from the exchange rate pressure
index and use three years crisis window to avoid registering currency crash
twice. Zhang (2001) takes the volatility of variables in the currency crisis ex-
plicitly into account ans employs time-dependent thresholds. Lestano et al.’s
version of Zhang’s method diﬀers from the original version in two respects:
the threshold diﬀers and they include interest rates in the index.
Table 1 summarizes the distribution of the ﬁnancial crises over the six
4See Lestano and Jacobs (2002) for a sensitivity analysis of the dating scheme to dif-
ferent values of the threshold. Moreover, threshold models are also sensitive to the time
period considered (see Dungey et al., 2003).
6Asian countries in our sample. Currency crises are distributed more or less
evenly over the six countries. With respect to the currency crisis deﬁnitions,
ERW, FR, the original KLR and LJK’s version of KLR produce more or less
the same number of currency crises (around 2.5% of the months). Zhang’s
deﬁnition with time-varying thresholds produces nearly three times as much
currency crises as ERW, FR and KLR. LJK’s version of Z has even more
crises dates, because they lowered the threshold.
Table 1: Currency crises: distribution over countries for various dating
schemes
ERW KLR(org) KLR(LJK) FR Z(org) Z(LJK)
Indonesia 10 (2.60%) 7 (1.82%) 9 (2.34%) 10 (2.60%) 27 (7.03%) 44 (11.46%)
Malaysia 10 (2.60%) 11 (2.86%) 10 (2.60%) 10 (2.60%) 21 (5.47%) 31 (8.07%)
Philippines 10 (2.60%) 9 (2.34%) 12 (3.13%) 11 (2.87%) 38 (9.90%) 52 (13.54%)
Singapore 14 (3.65%) 12 (3.13%) 11 (2.86%) 11 (2.87%) 16 (4.17%) 33 (8.59%)
South Korea 7 (1.82%) 6 (1.56%) 7 (1.82%) 10 (2.60%) 21 (5.47%) 27 (7.03%)
Thailand 9 (2.34%) 10 (2.60%) 9 (2.34%) 9 (2.34%) 17 (4.43%) 22 (5.73%)
All countries 60 (2.60%) 55 (2.39%) 58 (2.52%) 61 (2.65%) 140 (6.08%) 209 (9.07%)
The number between parentheses shows the frequency of crisis occurrence which is calcu-
lated by dividing the total number of crisis months by the total number of observations.
ERW, KLR, FR and Z represent currency crises dated by the method of Eichengreen,
Rose and Wyplosz, Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart, Frankel and Rose, and Zhang, re-
spectively. KLR(org) and Z(org) are the original crises dating schemes, KLR(LJK) and
Z(LJK) are own implementations.
Since each method adopts a diﬀerent deﬁnition of exchange rate market
pressure, judging which dating system identiﬁes currency crises best is not
trivial.5 Therefore we include all currency crises dating schemes in our model.
5Edison (2003) and Kamin, Schindler and Samuel (2001) reach a similar conclusion.
73 Factor analysis
This study focuses on indicators of macroeconomic development and external
shocks. Worsening of these indicators aﬀects the stability of ﬁnancial system
and may result in a ﬁnancial crisis. The indicators are selected on the basis
of economic theory as well as recent ﬁndings of empirical studies on ﬁnancial
crises. Another major consideration was the data availability on a monthly
basis for our country coverage and sample. For convenience, the indicators
are clustered into four major groups:
• External: Real exchange rates (REX), export growth (EXG), import
growth (IMP), terms of trade (TOT), ratio of the current account to
GDP (CAY), the ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves (MFR) and
growth of foreign exchange reserves (GFR).
• Financial: M1 and M2 growth (GM1 and GM2), M2 money multiplier
(MMM), the ratio of domestic credit to GDP (DCY), excess real M1
balances (ERM), domestic real interest rate (RIR), lending and deposit
rate spread (LDS), commercial bank deposits (CBD), and the ratio of
bank reserves to bank assets (RRA).
• Domestic (real and public): The ratio of ﬁscal balance to GDP (FBY),
the ratio of public debt to GDP (FBY), growth of industrial production
(GIP), changes in stock prices (CSP), inﬂation rate (INR), GDP per
capita (YPC), and growth of national saving (NSR).
• Global: Growth of world oil prices (WOP), US interest rate (USI), and
OECD GDP growth (ICY).
8The main source of all data is the International Financial Statistics of
the IMF for the macroeconomic and ﬁnancial indicators and the World Bank
Development Indicators for the debt variables. We use monthly data, cover-
ing six Asian countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South
Korea and Thailand, from January 1977 to the end of 2001. Missing data are
supplemented from Advance/Datastream and various reports of the country’s
central bank. All data in local currency units are converted into US dol-
lars. Some annual indicators are interpolated to obtain a complete monthly
database.
Table 2 lists deﬁnitions, sources and transformations of our crises indica-
tors. Two types of transformation are applied to make sure that the indica-
tors are free from seasonal eﬀects and stationary, i.e. 12-months percentage
change and deviation from linear trends. In case the indicator has no visi-
ble seasonal pattern and is non-trending, its level form is maintained. Some
unavailable indicators are proxied by closely related indicators, for example
OECD GDP is substituted by industrial production of industrial countries.
9Table 2: Explanatory variables: deﬁnition, source, and transformation
Indicator Code Deﬁnition and source Transformation
External sector (current account)
Real ex-
change rate
REX Nominal exchange rate is local currency
unit (LCU) per USD, IFS-AE. The CPI is
IFS-64. The real exchange rate is the ra-
tio of foreign (US CPI) to domestic prices
(measured in the same currency). Thus,
REX = ePf/P, where e = nominal ex-
change rate, P = domestic price (CPI),
and Pf = foreign price (US CPI). A de-
cline in the real exchange rate denotes a















TOT Unit value of exports divided by the unit
value of imports. Unit value of exports
is IFS-74.D. Import unit value for coun-
try (IFS-75.D) is not available, instead ex-









CAY Current account (IFS-78AL) divided by
nominal GDP (interpolated of IFS-99B).
-





MFR Ratio of M2 (IFS-34 plus IFS-35) and














Indicator Code Deﬁnition and source Transformation
Financial sector
M1 growth GM1 IFS-34 12 month
percentage
change













DCY Total domestic credit (IFS-32) divided by






ERM Percentage diﬀerence between M1 (IFS-
34) deﬂated by CPI (IFS-64) and esti-
mated demand for M1. Demand for real
M1 is estimated as function of real GDP,
nominal interest rates (IFS-60L), and a
time trend. If monthly real GDP data is
not available for a country, then its annual














LDS Lending interest rate (IFS-60P) divided




CBD Demand deposit (IFS-24) plus time, sav-
ings and foreign currency deposits (IFS-







RRA Bank reserves (IFS-20) divided by bank




Indicator Code Deﬁnition and source Transformation




FBY Government budget balance (IFS-80) di-






PBY Public and publicly guaranteed debt






GIP Industrial production index for Country is
not available, then index of primary pro-







CSP IFS-62 12 month
percentage
change





YPC GDP (interpolated IFS-99B) divided by






NSR public (IFS-91F) and private consumption
























12As already mentioned in the Introduction, the aim of this paper is to
construct a model that calculates the probability of a currency crisis. To do
so we use a binomial multivariate qualitative response approach. However,
the set of economic indicators that may contain information on whether or
not a crises will occur is huge. It is not feasible to include all indicators in
the logit model because of too few observations and multicollinearity among
the indicators. So, for each country we reduce the information set into a
limited number of factors using factor analysis. These factors are then used
as explanatory variables in the logit model.
Technically speaking, factor analysis transforms a set of random variables
linearly and orthogonally into new random variables.6 The ﬁrst factor is the
normalized linear combination of the original set of random variables with
maximum variance; The second factor is the normalized linear combination
with maximum variance of all linear combinations uncorrelated with the ﬁrst
factor; and so on. By construction factors are uncorrelated. The eigenvalue
for a given factor measures the variance in all the variables which is accounted
for by that factor. A factor with a low eigenvalue may be ignored, because
other factors are more important in explaining the variance in the set of
variables under consideration.
Unfortunately, there is no ”best” criterion for dropping the least impor-
tant factors. The so-called Kaiser criterion drops all factors with eigenvalues
below one. The Cattell scree test is a graphical method in which the eigen-
values are plotted on the vertical axis and the factors on the horizontal axis.
6For a detailed exposition of factor analysis including references see e.g., Venables and
Ripley (2002, Chapter 11).
13The test suggests to select the number of factors that corresponds to the
place of the curve where the smooth decrease of eigenvalues appears to level
oﬀ to the right of the plot. In general, the scree test provides a lower bound
on the number of relevant factors. In this paper we use the Kaiser criterion.
For most countries, eight factors emerge with an eigenvalue above unity.7
Table 3 lists eigenvalues and the total variance explained by the factors for
each country.
Table 3: Eigenvalues and the cumulative proportion of the variance explained
by the factors (h2)
Eigenvalues Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore South Korea Thailand
factor 1 5.93 7.79 5.58 7.88 7.55 6.69
factor 2 3.40 3.19 3.71 3.28 3.37 3.96
factor 3 2.84 2.38 2.60 2.78 2.60 3.37
factor 4 2.01 2.15 2.41 1.91 1.85 2.22
factor 5 1.91 1.93 1.72 1.66 1.63 1.72
factor 6 1.46 1.34 1.52 1.37 1.39 1.42
factor 7 1.20 1.12 1.11 1.01 1.25 1.34
factor 8 1.06 1.05 1.05 0.92 1.10 0.78
h2 0.76 0.81 0.76 0.83 0.80 0.83
4 Logit model
Since our dependent variable is a binary variable (0=no crisis and 1=cri-
sis) we use a binary choice model. Two popular versions are the probit and
the logit model. The major diﬀerence is that the probit model is based on
the normal distribution , whereas the logit model uses an S-shaped logistic
7For Singapore and Thailand we use also eight factors although only seven factors have
an eigenvalue above unity.
14function to constrain the probabilities to the [0,1] interval. Predicted prob-
abilities calculated by these models in practice only slightly diﬀer. We opt
for the logit model. Suppose the probability model is speciﬁed as
P = F(Z) =
1
1 + e−Z =
1
1 + e−(α+βX), (1)
where P is the probability that Z takes the value 1 and F is the cumulative
logistic probability function; X is the set of regressors and α and β are




= Z = α + βX. (2)
In our model, the vector of explanatory variables X consists of the eight
factors rather than the huge list of economic indicators themselves. Since the
change in the factors may aﬀect the probability of a currency crisis to occur,
we also include diﬀerences in the factors.8 Note that including diﬀerenced
factors reduces the number of observations for each country by one. Finally,
testing for ﬁxed eﬀects rejects the null of common eﬀects in all models except
the ERW and FR types of currency models. The results are presented in
Table 4. Note that intercepts and country-speciﬁc intercepts (ﬁxed eﬀects)
are not reported.
If we look at the likelihood ratio tests presented in Table 4, we conclude
that—excpet for the FR currency model—all variables (factors in levels and
in diﬀerences) contribute signiﬁcantly to the explanation of the variation in
8It should be noted that it would not be correct to include factors and lagged factors
because of signiﬁcant temporal dependence in the factors.
15the crises dummies. Also, testing (not reported) whether the diﬀerences in
the factors contribute signiﬁcantly to the explanation of the variation in the
crises dummies, leads us to conclude that this indeed is the case for all but
the FR-type of currency crisis models.
The estimation results presented in Table 4 gives rise to a number of
conclusions. First, factor 1 has the biggest impact on the predicted proba-
bility of a currency crises. Moreover factor 1 is signiﬁcant at 1% in all but
one (FR) currency crises models. We will examine this factor in some more
detail below. Second, factor 8 is signiﬁcant at 1% in the KLR versions of
currency crises models. Third, at a 1% signiﬁcance level, only factor 4 adds
to explain crises probabilities in the FR currency model. Fourth, factors 3
and 4 are signiﬁcant at 1% in the Z currency crises models.
Factor 1 by far shows the biggest contribution to predicting crises proba-
bilities. Although interpretation of the estimated coeﬃcients in terms of the
underlying indicators is not trivial, it is informative to examine the eigen-
vector of factor 1. Factor 1 is a linear combination of the indicators with
weights given by the ﬁrst eigenvector. These weights are presented in Ta-
ble 5. The biggest weights in factor 1 are related to the growth of money (M1
and M2)—supporting Kamin, Schindler and Samuel (2001)—,the growth of
national saving, the rate of growth of GDP per capita, and import growth.
These variables are dominant for all countries in our sample. Other variables
that have an impact in some countries are commercial bank deposits, growth
of foreign exchange reserves, export growth, and to a lesser extent domestic
real interest rate, terms of trade, and growth of world oil prices.
16Table 4: Estimation results of the binomial logit model (ﬁxed eﬀects not
reported) with Huber-White robust standard errors.
ERW KLR(org) KLR(LJK)
Coeﬃcient z-statistic Coeﬃcient z-statistic Coeﬃcient z-statistic
factor 1 −0.22 −3.94 −0.41 −4.80 −0.27 −4.14
∆(factor 1) −1.07 −4.76 −1.79 −5.32 −1.78 −7.03
factor 2 0.05 0.52 0.05 0.41 0.09 0.80
∆(factor 2) −0.06 −0.17 −0.22 −0.73 −0.52 −1.71
factor 3 0.09 1.04 0.12 0.92 0.22 2.03
∆(factor 3) −0.23 −0.75 0.36 1.11 −0.13 −0.39
factor 4 0.22 2.10 0.33 2.38 0.39 3.31
∆(factor 4) 0.15 0.55 0.64 2.31 0.15 0.58
factor 5 0.17 1.74 0.14 0.93 0.19 1.67
∆(factor 5) 0.60 1.84 0.34 0.96 0.53 1.63
factor 6 0.08 0.74 0.04 0.25 0.07 0.50
∆(factor 6) 0.11 0.42 0.44 1.14 0.60 2.22
factor 7 −0.04 −0.44 0.16 1.26 0.14 1.22
∆(factor 7) 0.17 0.62 −0.12 −0.42 0.06 0.24
factor 8 0.16 1.28 −0.16 −0.82 −0.10 −0.61
∆(factor 8) 0.45 2.33 0.80 3.48 0.8 3.83
McFadden R2 0.18 0.42 0.38
Observations with Dep=1 60 55 58
Likelihood ratio statistic, χ2(16 d.f.) 100.31 216.99 202.66
FR Z(org) Z(LJK)
Coeﬃcient z-statistic Coeﬃcient z-statistic Coeﬃcient z-statistic
factor 1 −0.02 −0.44 −0.13 −2.87 −0.06 −1.73
∆(factor 1) 0.02 0.09 −1.38 −7.60 −0.97 −6.58
factor 2 −0.04 −0.50 0.12 2.05 0.07 1.40
∆(factor 2) −0.45 −1.73 −0.15 −0.77 −0.13 −0.70
factor 3 −0.02 −0.28 0.10 1.62 0.15 3.09
∆(factor 3) −0.46 −1.84 0.65 3.02 0.31 1.71
factor 4 0.26 3.45 0.20 3.09 0.17 2.87
∆(factor 4) 0.05 0.22 0.60 2.99 0.42 2.39
factor 5 0.06 0.50 0.03 0.41 0.06 0.88
∆(factor 5) 0.38 1.45 −0.05 −0.24 0.04 0.20
factor 6 0.09 0.75 0.17 2.37 0.16 2.58
∆(factor 6) 0.08 0.30 −0.17 −0.80 −0.05 −0.30
factor 7 −0.04 −0.38 0.15 1.72 0.07 1.00
∆(factor 7) 0.31 1.70 −0.14 −0.66 −0.22 −1.24
factor 8 0.13 0.92 0.09 0.80 0.10 1.29
∆(factor 8) 0.13 0.57 0.24 1.57 0.24 1.76
McFadden R2 0.04 0.19 0.11
Observations with Dep=1 59 140 209
Likelihood ratio statistic, χ2(16 d.f.) 20.63 199.56 148.04
ERW, KLR, FR and Z represent currency crises dated by the method of Eichengreen,
Rose and Wyplosz, Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart, Frankel and Rose, and Zhang, re-
spectively. KLR(org) and Z(org) are the original crises dating schemes, KLR(LJK) and
Z(LJK) are versions of Lestano, Jacobs and Kuper.
Critical values of the z-statistic at the 1% and 5% level are 2.57 and 1.96, respectively.
The critical value of the likelihood ratio test at 1% (16 d.f.) is 32.00.
17Table 5: Weights of the ﬁrst factor
Indicator Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore South Korea Thailand
CAY 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.00
CBD 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.05
CSP 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
DCY 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02
ERM 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
EXG 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.08 0.06
FBY 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02
GFR 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.07
GIP 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.04
GM1 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.06 0.09
GM2 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.06 0.10
ICY 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
IMP 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09
INR 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.02
LDS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.01
MFR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
MMM 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01
NSR 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.12
PBY 0.06 0.00 0.01 NA 0.00 0.02
REX 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.04
RIR 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.02
RRA 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.00
TOT 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.01
USI 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.02
WOP 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.03
YPC 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.12
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
185 Signaling crises
The logit models discussed above estimate probabilities of crises to occur.
High probabilities signal crises. But the model might also give false signals,
i.e., a crisis does not take place despite the logit model producing a high
probability. There are four possibilities. A model may indicate a crisis (high
estimated probability) when a crisis indeed occurs (P(1,1)) or it may indicate
a crisis when no crisis actually takes place (P(1,0)). It is also possible that
the model does not signal a crisis (low estimated probability) where in fact
a crisis does occur (P(0,1)). The ﬁnal possibility (P(0,0)) is a situation in
which the model does not predict a crisis and no crisis occurs. Table 6 lists
the four possibilities.
Table 6: The probabilities of right and wrong crisis predictions
Crisis (Z = 1) No crisis (Z = 0)
high P(1,1) P(1,0)
Estimated probability
low P(0,1) = 1 − P(1,1) P(0,0) = 1 − P(1,0)
The model signals a crisis when the estimated probability is high. We
calculate the probability in periods detected as crises as:
P(1,1) =
P
t ˆ PtZt P
t Zt
, (3)
where ˆ Pt is the estimated probability from the logit model at time t and Zt
is the crisis index dummy which equals one if a crisis occurs at time t, and








which produces a false signal or noise. Note that P(0,1) = 1 − P(1,1) is
also a false signal: the estimated probability is low, whereas a crisis did
occur. Similarly, P(0,0) = 1−P(1,0) is a correct signal, since the estimated
probability is low and there is no crisis.
Now, we can calculate the signal-to-noise ratio S/N as a measure of per-







A value below one indicates that the model gives more false than right sig-
nals. The higher the signal-to-noise ratio, the better the model performs. A
number like 2 indicates that the model indicates a signal level which is 100%
above the noise level. In other words, the model produces twice as many
signals then noise.
Table 7 lists the good (P(1,1)) and bad (P(1,0)) crisis signals and the
signal to noise ratio for the various types of ﬁnancial crises and the six Asian
countries in our sample. From the signal-to-noise ratio it is easily seen that
the currency crisis models based on the dating methodology of Kaminsky,
Lizondo and Reinhart (KLR) outperform the other models. The FR-type of
currency model performances poorly. This is not surprising since the factors
identiﬁed in this paper hardly help to explain the probability of currency
crises as dated by Frankel and Rose.
20Table 7: Signalling crises
ERW KLR(org) KLR(LJK) FR Z(org) Z(LJK)
Indonesia P(1,1) 0.07 0.26 0.26 0.03 0.19 0.18
P(1,0) 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.11
S/N 1.10 1.65 1.64 1.01 1.30 1.17
South Korea P(1,1) 0.24 0.45 0.36 0.03 0.24 0.18
P(1,0) 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.06
S/N 1.57 2.61 2.05 1.02 1.50 1.27
Malaysia P(1,1) 0.15 0.35 0.33 0.03 0.18 0.16
P(1,0) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.07
S/N 1.31 1.97 1.90 1.02 1.31 1.19
Philippines P(1,1) 0.31 0.54 0.41 0.04 0.28 0.26
P(1,0) 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.12
S/N 1.82 3.21 2.26 1.03 1.52 1.35
Singapore P(1,1) 0.08 0.21 0.19 0.04 0.10 0.13
P(1,0) 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.08
S/N 1.11 1.45 1.40 1.03 1.13 1.11
Thailand P(1,1) 0.27 0.44 0.40 0.03 0.30 0.20
P(1,0) 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05
S/N 1.66 2.45 2.26 1.01 1.73 1.36
ERW, KLR, FR and Z represent currency crises dated by the method of Eichengreen,
Rose and Wyplosz, Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart, Frankel and Rose, and Zhang, re-
spectively. KLR(org) and Z(org) are the original crises dating schemes, KLR(LJK) and
Z(LJK) are versions of Lestano, Jacobs and Kuper.
P(1,1)=the estimated probability is high and a crisis does occur; P(1,0)=the estimated
probability is high and a crisis does not occur; S/N is the signal-to-noise ratio; – means
no crisis observations.
216 Conclusion
This paper builds an econometric EWS of six Asian countries, Malaysia, In-
donesia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand. We set up qual-
itative choice—in our case logit—models for diﬀerent versions of currency
crises. From the literature we extract a broad set of potentially relevant
ﬁnancial crisis indicators which are combined into factors using factor anal-
ysis. These factors are used as explanatory variables in a panel covering the
period January 1970–December 2001.
The factor analysis in combination with the estimation results of the logit
model allows the general conclusion that (some) indicators of ﬁnancial crises
do work, at least in our EWS of Asia. We ﬁnd that the rates of growth of
money (M1 and M2), GDP per capita, national savings, and import growth
correlate with all deﬁnitions of currency crises. So, our method oﬀers a so-
lution to the bad (mixed and weak in timing of crisis) performance of EWS
as noted by IMF (2002) and Edison (2003). A second, important conclusion
is that ﬁrst diﬀerences in indicators add to explaining probabilities of cur-
rency crises. Including dynamics in the factors improves the speciﬁcation of
EWS models and makes it a more powerful surveillance instrument for policy
makers.
Existing EWS models diﬀer in terms of crises deﬁnitions and in the way
crises periods are identiﬁed. An additional feature of our paper is the distinc-
tion between diﬀerent currency crisis dating deﬁnitions, which are evaluated
in terms of the power of signaling crises. A within-sample signal extraction
experiment reveals that the method of Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart is
22superior to the dating schemes of Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz, Frankel
and Rose, and Zhang.
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